Today, at the SSC meeting, we discussed the measures to counter the manipulation of information and foreign interference in electoral processes. There is important information about the risks to our country’s security and democratic processes in the Republic of Moldova. These risks must be brought to the attention of the citizens.
The Russian Federation wants to control the Republic of Moldova, starting from this fall and is preparing an unprecedented interference in the September elections. Starting this fall, the Russian Federation seeks to control the Republic of Moldova and is preparing unprecedented interference in the September elections. The risks to the public order and national security are high, and all institutions, as well as the entire society, must become aware of the danger and take steps to protect ourselves.
Kremlin is investing in several political tools/vehicles to get its people into the next parliament, intending to gain control over power in Moldova:
The so-called sovereignist movement, which has nothing to do with the sovereignty of our country and whose purpose is to promote an alternative development path for Moldova by subordinating our national interests to those of the Russian Federation, and promoting Euroscepticism.
The aggressive populist movement, directly orchestrated by the criminal group Șor. Particularly through destabilising activities and creating vote-buying networks. These forces aim to recruit violent individuals for protests. These actions are planned involving other organised crime groups and acts of vandalism against State institutions.
Political projects targeting the moderate pro-European electorate and projects under a “false flag”. The Russian Federation is also behind some independent candidates who are not directly controlled, but are indirectly supported to fill the information space with “impartial” criticism of the State and some electoral competitors.
All of these political projects are coordinated from the same command centre and are set to receive funding and propaganda support from Moscow, largely through corruption schemes organised by the Șor group.
The institutions’ analyses show 10 main instruments of interference in Moldova’s political and electoral processes:
Electoral corruption and illicit external financing are the main threats in the September 28th elections - through cryptocurrencies, networks of “couriers”, and money laundering schemes to corrupt the electoral process (transfers to those who have accounts in Promsviazbank, subsequently capitalised through conversion schemes, illicit financing of election campaigns, financing of disinformation and destabilisation operations, corruption of persons in the legal system). Funding of approximately €100 million is planned through cryptocurrencies alone. Networks for laundering and distributing funds. Here, microcredit is used for hidden financing. Dear citizens, this is a serious problem that can affect you personally. We know that microloans are being taken out in the names of thousands of Moldovan citizens in Russian banks without their knowledge. You may find yourself with debts to Russian banks that you don’t even know about. Do not give your data to these groups, which are only using you.
Selling a vote is a serious crime - those who sell their votes risk a fine ranging from 25,000 to 37,500 lei. Approximately 25,000 fines have already been imposed, generating nearly 15 million lei in revenue. If the crime is committed in the interests of a criminal organisation, the penalty is 8 to 15 years in prison.
Punishment for those who organise vote buying - electoral corruption is punished with imprisonment from 2 to 6 years, a fine ranging from 37,500 lei to 57,500 lei, and the deprivation of the right to hold certain positions. Please be very careful not to give your data to these criminal groups and not to allow yourself to be manipulated or used. If the crime is committed in the interests of a criminal organisation, the penalty is 8 to 15 years in prison. Police and prosecutors have already opened 62 criminal cases in 2025.
Foreign information manipulation campaigns. The information space will continue to be one of the main areas of influence, managed both by Russian secret services and by Moldovan actors connected to Moscow. Lies, letters, calls, messages, documents - all fake - will poison our information space daily (e.g., emails sent to our citizens abroad on behalf of state institutions, such as the CEC, urging them to vote for a certain party; accusations of pre-election fraud; deepfake videos featuring Moldovan officials; anti-EU messages, messages about "imminent famine" or "war"). Smear campaigns and personal attacks - pro-European leaders, journalists, and well-known people are being smeared. These campaigns are carried out through fabricated content, insults, and aggressive visual editing. Promotion of messages as if they came from me or other officials, in which I urge people to invest in certain projects, banks, or financial schemes. All these messages are false. Please be very vigilant, do not believe them, and do not allocate money to such schemes. All of this is aimed at increasing stress levels within the society and undermining people's trust in the Moldovan state. The fakes are promoted both in the local and international media. Probably, you have already read in the press about campaigns launched by the Russian Federation targeting me, for example, in the international press, which is not authentic press, but rather fabricated websites claiming to be international publications. For the most part, this false content is generated by Artificial Intelligence and promoted also by AI.
The Centre for Strategic Communication and Combating Disinformation must publicly communicate the propaganda’s lines of attack. All state institutions must react immediately to falsehoods and inform society quickly, clearly, and transparently.
Each one of us can stop a falsehood/fake news/false information - by not sharing it, by informing people about the lie, by paying close attention to what we read, what we believe, and what we share with others. Here, only our discernment can save us.
Organisation of paid protests - artificial protests in exchange of financial rewards, aimed at exhausting and disorienting the public, creating the false perception of widespread dissatisfaction in society, destabilising public order, and putting immense pressure on State institutions (e.g., the protests in 2023, where participants were paid in cash; organised transportation; mobilisations via WhatsApp and Telegram with centralised logistical coordination in Chișinău, Comrat). The police have already reported instances of paid protests in 2025 as well, and following this year’s legislative changes, financial remuneration for participating in protests is punishable as an administrative offence.
Cyberattacks on digital infrastructure, which ensures the conduct of elections and other critical infrastructure targets (entities that provide essential services to citizens). Objectives: blocking and rendering unavailable the electoral infrastructure and the websites of state institutions. Phishing attacks on government infrastructure to obtain unauthorised access to sensitive data. Creation of fake platforms or cloning of official resources.
The use of the church for the interests of a foreign state and the instrumentalisation of religion - aimed at spreading fear and radicalising various segments of the population (e.g., organising pilgrimages to Russia, where individuals are trained on how to carry out such activities, media and logistical support from groups affiliated with Russia; actions of the "Eurasia" foundation registered by Șor's team, with indirect external support, possibly from the FSB). Here I want to remind the priests that betraying your neighbour, selling your country, is a grave sin.
The use of online communication platforms. First and foremost, Telegram. On Telegram, mobilisation for protests is organised in closed groups, along with the distribution of information about rewards for participating in protests and, above all, organising schemes to corrupt voters. This occurred last year and is happening again this year. Telegram is also used to promote messages that seek to normalise vote buying. Unfortunately, there is no communication with Telegram, or rather, there is no response when state institutions report falsehoods or voter corruption on this platform. Of course, other platforms are also used: TikTok, Facebook, and Instagram. On TikTok, we see the creation of thousands of accounts to amplify anti-EU and anti-government messages. On TikTok, we see thousands of accounts being created to amplify anti-EU and anti-government messages. On TikTok, there is a certain level of communication, and we will see whether there will be any cooperation regarding these fake accounts, which violate the law. Similarly, on Facebook and Instagram, we see disinformation, emotional manipulation, and attempts to create anxiety and fear in society.
The involvement of organised crime in destabilisation actions involves enlisting members of the criminal underworld in organising disruptive activities both within and outside penitentiary institutions. The involvement of the high-risk sports environment. These actions are coordinated by certain leaders of organised criminal groups such as Caramalac and Pruteanu.
Sabotaging the electoral process in the diaspora: actions to compromise/reduce citizen participation in voting (sabotage or provocations near polling stations, obstruction of polling station activities, monitoring by fake observers, attempts to corrupt voters, narratives that divide society about who has the right to decide the fate of the country and who does not).
Hybrid influences on the electorate in the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia and the left bank of the Dniester:
The Transnistrian region: training of groups affiliated with the Șor group, actions by actors in favour of certain political forces, actions to corrupt voters in the region, organised mobilisation and movement, and use of online platforms to distribute false information. Challenges in the Security Zone, demonstrations of force, and energy crises on the eve of election day are also possible.
Actions to radicalise the Chișinău-Comrat relationship, organising protests, corrupting voters, and spreading false narratives about risks to autonomy. All of these are promoted with the support of the Russian Federation.
Online mobilisation and radicalisation – the development of digital cells that promote extremism and incite hatred and civil disobedience. Kremlin-paid influencers are and will continue to be used for these actions.
These actions aim to increase social tensions, weaken people's trust in the State, and generate violence. The greatest danger of Russia's interference in our internal affairs is that it poses a direct threat to our national security, sovereignty, and our country's European future.
Institutions must collaborate much more closely in the coming period to exchange data, identify and halt attempts to circumvent the law, create institutional mechanisms for information-sharing amid increasing information manipulation, and act in a unified and professional manner to protect the national interest.
Dear citizens, we are facing a difficult period. We will be subject to well-organised external interference, with vast financial resources and criminal groups involved. This should not frighten us, but rather mobilise us. Our institutions have an important duty, and they know what must be done. But citizens also bear great responsibility - the information we consume, the actions we take, what we believe, and how we make decisions - all of this determines the future of Moldova. And all of us who are connected to Moldova and love Moldova - want a future in the European Union, in peace and development.